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B 
The oil crisis and the present economic context have highlighted the need 
for a rational use of energy. To this end, the objectives must be careful 
selection of energy sources, more efficient transformation of one form of energy 
into another, more efficient heat insulation and the recovery of heat from some 
thermodynamic processes. 
It follows that in the decades to come both industrialized and developing 
countries will have to cope with a series of problems in obtaining various forms 
of energy. 
This is a delicate subject for various reasons, including the high degree of 
dependence on oil from third countries, the lack of diversification in the supply 
areas and the constant growth in demand for energy in the developing countries 
as a result of demographic growth, industrialization and urbanization. 
On the other hand, our planet still has a wealth of energy sources and at 
the same time receives an abundant and uninterrupted flow of energy from the sun. 
It is thus evident that, far from being due to the threat that the immense 
energy sources at our disposal will be depleted, the precarious supply situation 
is due primarily to the difficulty of developing quickly more efficient technologies 
for exploiting alternative sources and, often, to the fact that it is impossible 
to protect supplies because of political and economic tension. 
To cope with the supply problems that began in 1973, the industrialized 
countries have mainly followed a strategy of gradually replacing oil with other 
fossil fuels. 
The Community's dependence on energy imports began to increase substantially 
in 1950 with a few exceptions due to the exploitation of North Sea oil and gas. 
The European Community currently consumes the energy equivalent of 900 million 
tonnes of oil a year, 45% of it being imported and the remaining 55% produced in 
the Community. Oil accounts for more than 75% of all the energy imported. 
These are the figures for the Community as a whole. The situation is far 
from good when we consider that the Community depended on imports for 55% of its 
energy in 1973. 
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Individual Member States show wide variations from the Community average, 
and some are particularly vulnerable. 
In recent decades oil has assumed importance in the energy balance of the 
more industrialized countries because it can be put to a variety of uses, is 
easy to transport and store. In addition, until ten years ago, oil was a really 
cheap source of energy with reserves being intensively exploited on a large scale. 
The twentieth century has certainly seen oil triumphant. The more developed 
countries, that have experienced the 'oil civilization' and undeniab~ enjoyed 
unprecedented prosperity as a result, have been trapped into dependence on a 
source of energy that they cannot control and that, despite everything, continues 
to be the driving force behind their economies. 
As a result, the Community's energy strategy has been to intensify the 
energy savings policy which so far has produced good results. 
But paradoxically one of the sectors that has been less than brilliant 
since 1973 is nuclear energy. 
Ever since the 50s people have become aware of the fact that fossil fuel 
resources are limited and bound to become rare and expensive. It was then that 
the American Administration launched its 'Atom for Peace' programme with the 
objective of reducing dependence on external sources of energy through specific 
use of the atom. 
At the same time Western Europe was becoming more and more dependent on 
energy imports; oil dependence was increasing rapidly, particularly in the 
countries that were in the process of creating the Europen Community. 
For example, in 1950 Italy depended on external sources for 60% of its 
energy supplies and France for 30%. The signing of the Euratom Treaty in 1957 
represented an important step in the development of new energy sources and made 
a significant contribution to the reconstruction and pacific growth of our 
continent. 
The original reasons for developing nuclear energy are as valid today as 
they were then. Research into alternative energy sources <solar and geothermal, 
energy, wave power, etc.) was prompted by the same reasons as research in the 
nuclear sector, which it complements rather than replaces. Experience in the past 
decade has fully confirmed the importance of diversifying sources of energy. 
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However, the development of nuclear energy policies has been paradoxical 
in the past decade. Before the oil crisis in 1973, large numbers of 
electricity generating nuclear plants were ordered throughout the world on 
an economically competitive basis. Almost all the nuclear plants now in 
service (50,000 MW in the European Community, 65,000 MW in USA and 18,000 MW 
in Japan) were ordered ~~fQ!~ 1973. 
Not only did nuclear energy rapidly capture a share of the market, 
most of the industrialized countries also pursued the development of 
advanced nuclear reactors and the study of fuel cycles vigorously; they 
did so in knowledge of the fact that uranium resources were limited and had 
therefore to be used more rationally and that sooner or later nuclear 
energy could be used for non-electric applications (process heat, metallurgy, 
the production of synthetic fuels) in order to husband the oil and gas 
normally used in those applications. We should not forget that electricity 
accounts for only some 30-35% of the energy consumed. 
Between 1971 and 1973 high temperature reactors with a total capacity 
of 8,000 MW were ordered in the USA and techniques for reprocessing and 
storing waste were already being developed and gradually applied. 
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The oil crisis in 1973 once again highlighted the fact that oil reserves 
were not endless and that overdependence on it and on energy imports in general 
was undesirable for any country. Even the United States, then dependent on 
imports for only 17X of their energy requirements and with ample energy reserves 
including coal, were concerned and launched their independence project. The 
EEC, which in 1973 depended on imports for 55X of its energy, was even harder 
hit. 
Logically, the 1973 crisis should therefore have further encouraged the 
development of nuclear energy. Interest in nuclear energy increased and it 
suddenly became a better economic proposition than fossil fuels. 
In fact, not all the expectations placed in nuclear energy were fulfilled 
and the rapid expansion then foreseen for nuclear energy in the more industrialized 
countries came to nothing. Here it is worth mentioning some factors that 
undoubtedly helped to slow down the development of nuclear energy. They explain 
the apparent paradox that the oil crisis slowed down rather than accelerated 
the development of nuclear energy. One of the main causes is the economic 
climate prevailing in the past ten years. It would be unfair to blame the 
oil crisis for all the setbacks, but it undeniably helped to trigger off a 
worldwide process of economic recession from which we are only now beginning 
to emerge. 
Figure 1, based on EUROSTAT figures1, shows the trend of oil prices and 
the trend in unemployment during the same period. 
The economic recession and energy savings which have perhaps been the 
most important practical reaction to the oil crisis, combined with a slowing 
down of the growth in demand for electricity, have certainly not encouraged the 
construction of nuclear plants. In many cases, they have instead led to the 
cancellation of orders already placed. 
A second factor is public opposition to nuclear energy. The so-called 
nuclear controversy initiated by ecological movements at the beginning of the 70s 
had an important political impact. Increased concern with safety and the 
environment led to more complex licensing procedures in many countries and made 
the time needed to complete nuclear power plants longer, and what is worse, 
unpredictable. 
1see Annex 1 
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In addition, govern.ents and public alike beca•e increasingly aware that the 
develo~ent of nuclear energy for peaceful ends could increase the risk of a 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was against this background that the 
world international fuel cycle evaluation progra..e (INFCEP> was launched between 
1978 and 1980 following a Carter A~inistration reca..endation. The European 
Community also took an interest in this and Parlia•ent appointed Mr Protogene 
Veronesi as its rapporteur. 
Partly because of their different supply situations, each country with an 
energy policy reacted to world events with a different approach to the question of 
nuclear energy. And that is one reason why there are differences on the world 
scene today. 
With the exception of France, the rate of construction of nuclear power plants 
has not come up to the expectations of the 70s. In the USA in particular so many 
orders have been cancelled in the past 10 years that there are fewer GW on order 
today than there were 10 years ago <Figure 2> 1• 
The cancellation of some 110 GW has already cost 10 billion. 
been placed since 1978. 
No orders have 
In the European Community (figure 3> 2 on the other hand, orders for nuclear 
power plants were placed at a much slower rate than in the USA and thus there were 
not the same mass cancellations. 
In this situation it was not just water reactors, i.e. those already 
commissioned, that suffered but also advanced reactors whose development got off to 
a rapid start at the beginning of the seventies. With the exception of fast breeders 
in Europe, that decade saw an abrupt halt in HTGR research and development 
programmes for the reasons given above. 
The experience and skills so far acquired in the HTGR research programmes 
could therefore be irretrievably lost, to the detriment of the European strategy 
in which energy independence is a prime objective. 
To cope with the possibly rapid deterioration of the Community's hydrocarbon 
supply situation after the year 2000, nuclear fission must maintain and if ~ossible 
increase its contribution to the Community's energy balance in the first part of 
the next century. 
1see Annex 11 
2see Annex Ill 
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There is no need to reiterate that the Community's dependence on imported 
uranium could impede implementation of a proper nuclear energy policy and in the 
end bring about its premature decline. 
This is a risk the Community cannot afford to take since: 
(a) thermonuclear fusion has not yet proved its technological feasibility. In 
any case it could probably not be exploited commercially much before the 
end of the first half of the next century; 
(b) no matter how great the contribution of renewable energy sources <solar 
energy, geothermal energy etc.> and coal to the Community's energy balance 
in the first part of the next century, it would be irrational to expect it 
to compensate for a drop in supplies of ~Q!h hydrocarbons~~~ nuclear energy. 
In this context consideration should be given to the alternative of fast 
super-converter reactors and high temperature reactors (HTR> that ~~~-!h~-f~~! 
mQ£~_£2!iQ02!1~ and, in the case of the latter, offer the possibility of producing 
synthetic fuels and process heat in addition to electricity and so turn Europe's 
important source of energy to the best use. 
The nuclear reactors currently in operation are mostly light water reactors 
(PWR or BWR> 1• The fuel they use is enriched uranium <about 3% of uranium 235): 
the enrichment process leaves unused large quantities of depleted uranium (uranium 
with a low fissile uranium 235 content> which superconverters can use up entirely. 
For insta~ce, the depleted uranium produced in a single year by the EURODIF 
enrichment plant could feed 1QQ 1,000 MWe f2~1_[~~£1Q!~ for 50 years. Superconverters 
also need plutonium to function. This is produced in large quantities by thermal 
reactors <with the reactors currently in operation and under construction Western 
Europe will have 25 tonnes a year). 
Fast reactors thus produce energy from a by-product of the PWR or BWR fuel 
cycle that accumulates continuously and by the end of the century will have the 
potential for producing electricity for several centuries. 
The advanced reactors considered promising from an economic point of view 
(in Western Europe and the United States> are helium-cooled graphite moderated 
high temperature reactors <HTR) and sodium-cooled fast breeders (SNR or FBR). 
1PWR = Pressurized Water Reactor 
BWR =Boiling water Reactor 
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Other types of reactors previously considered, particularly advanced gas-cooled 
reactors (AGR) and heavy water reactors (HWR) have not come up to expectations. 
Canadian efforts to create heavy water electricity generating plants of the 
CANDU type deserve mention; AECL has exported some plants of this type to India, 
Pakistan and Argentina. 
The success of advanced reactors alongside LWR reactors, in which the whole 
world has a stake, depends not only on the time they will need to reach technical 
maturity but on many other parameters. 
Of all the possible strategies, the best, given a specific trend in electricity 
requirements, is to satisfy them at the lowest cost and with minimum supply 
difficulties, taking account of existing electricity generating plants. In concrete 
terms, this means reducing to a minimum the total cost of building the plants, of 
the fuel cycle and of their operation and maintenance. 
As for the HTR, one of its characteristics in addition to those mentioned 
below is that it can use thorium, the fertile element most abundant in nature. 
Moreover, this second generation of thermal reactors has advantages in that 
they are safe, may be located in the vicinity of towns, are easy to operate and 
maintain, have a flexible fuel cycle and aboye all offer access to new markets 
because of their ability to produce very high temperatures (9500 C) useful for 
such applications as methane reforming, the Brayton cycle (gas turbine>, process 
steam and the thermochemical production of hydrogen. 
Although a single reactor can use uranium efficiently <with at least 60 times 
the efficiency of a thermal reactor>, the total energy output of uranium in a 
combined system of fast and thermal reactors will depend on the ratio of thermal 
reactors to fast reactors at any moment. The output will increase as the installed 
fast reactor capacity increases by comparison with the total installed nuclear 
power. In a combined system of light water-cooled thermal reactors and sodium-
cooled fast reactors, the maximum output is achieved when' the proportion of fast 
reactors is of the order of 50 to ?OX of the total. 
- 13 - PE 89.172/fin. 
The proportion of fast reactors needed to attain the maximum uranium 
energy output decreases as the performance of the fast reactors or thermal 
reactors improves. 
From this it can be deduced, firstly, that the improvement of thermal 
reactors is still an important objective <the HTR could help towards this). 
secondly, this highlights the fact that the construction of enough fast 
reactors considerably to improve the total energy output of uranium requires 
a considerable length of time <at least 20 years). In fact, the installation 
of fast reactors depends mainly on the rate at which plutonium is produced by 
the thermal reactors and fast reactors themselves. 
Considering the Community's present uranium supply situation, the objective 
of fast super-converters should be to meet the Community's increased electricity 
requirements during the first quarter of the next century and at the same time 
gradually reduce its annual uranium requirements. 
It follows that: 
The complex and costly fast breeder programmes are amply validated and justified 
by the following arguments: 
the plutonium produced by fission in termal reactors can be used most economically 
in fast breeders; 
fast reactors are capable of converting non-fissile uranium, making better 
use of existing uranium resources; 
using fast breeders, the quantity of energy obtainable from known uranium 
reserves is considerably greater than all the fossil energy reserves put 
together; 
fast breeders do not depend on imports of natural uranium and are not affected 
by related supply difficulties; 
the cost of the electricity produced by fast breeders is totally unrelated 
to the price of uranium or fluctuations in that price; the cost of the uranium 
enrichment phase is also saved. 
Current thinking is that liquid sodium is the most suitable coolant as it 
provides good heat transfer. 
Sodium however also has certain unfavourable chemical properties: it reacts 
violently with water and has limited compatibility with other materials. Since 
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it becomes radioactive in the reactor, there is an intermediate non-radioactive 
sodium circuit in addition to the steam generating circuit. 
In the past 25 years most of the Member States of the Community have devoted 
considerable energy to developing liquid metal-cooled fast super-converter 
reactors and have allocated vast financial resources for the purpose. Even 
today the cost of developing these reactors accounts for some 20X of the total 
cost of research, design and development in the energy sector. 
Important technical objectives have been achieved as a result: 
various experimental and prototype reactors have successfully been constructed 
and commissioned and a large <1,200 MWe) power plant is almost completed. The 
results are unparalleled anywhere else in the world. 
The following table summarizes reactor projects completed or under 
consideration, broken down by country or group of countries. 
The dates given in brackets are the scheduled commissioning dates. 
Country Experimental and 
test reactors 
United Kingdom 
France 
FRG 
Italy 
DFR(1963) 
Rapsodie <1967) 
KNK II 4 
(1977) 
PEC <1986) 
Prototypes 
(200-300 MW) 
PFR (1974) 
Phenix <1974) 
. SNR 3002 
<1986) 
Demonstration 
plants 
(1200 MWe) 
CFR 
Project not yet 
approved 
Super-Phenix1 
(1984) 
Project not yet 
approved 
---------------- ---------------------- ------------------- --------------------1In collaboration with Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and the 
Netherlands. 
2In collaboration with Belgium and the Netherlands. 
3In collaboration with France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
4In collaboration with Belgium and the Netherlands. 
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The table shows that the ·Member States have tended to cooperate on the 
construction of demonstration plants. 
Major cooperation agreements have been concluded between research organi-
zations and industry (electricity, design and construction companies) in various 
Member States. 
Outside the Community too, most of the industrialized countries have 
seriously committed themselves to the fast super-converter sector. 
In the USA the 200 MWth EFFBR experimental plant functioned from 1963 
to 1972 and provided a valuable series of experimental data on various reactor 
systems. The 62.5 MWth EBR-II experimental reactor has been in operation since 
1965, and in 1980 construction of the 400 MWth FFTF experimental reactor was 
completed. Given its power, it will in practice function as a demonstration 
plant. 
Construction of the Clinch River breeder reactor <CRBR) was halted by the 
Carter administration and the prospects for this demonstration project are still 
uncertain. 
In Japan the JOYO experimental fast reactor with a design power of 100 MWth 
<spring 1983) has been in operation since 1977. 
The design for the 300 MWe prototype reactor MONJU has been completed and 
a decision was recently taken to go ahead with construction. 
Preliminary plans are being drawn up for a larger demonstration reactor 
and construction is planned to start one year after MONJU has been commissioned. 
A series of pre-commercial reactors will then be constructed, similar in size and 
design to the demonstration reactor. 
In the USSR design and construction of fast reactors is an essential feature 
of the national energy programme. Two experimental reactors are at present in 
operation, the 600 MWth BOR 60 and the 10 MWth BR-10. 
The BN-350 demonstration reactor has operated successfully at a power of 
350 MWe since 1973 and is being used for seawater desalination. The second 
600 MWe demonstration reactor, the BN-600, has been in operation since 1981 and 
plans are now being drawn up for the commercial fast reactor, the BN-1600 MWe. 
Consideration is also being given to the possibility of increasing the power of 
the BN-600 reactor to 800 MWe. 
- 16 - PE 89.172/fin. 
The high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) is the logical follow-up 
to the Magnox carbon dioxide-cooled graphite moderated reactor. 
This was the first industrially successful reactor in West~rn Europe in 
the 50s. It was developed and industrialized in France and the United KingdoM 
and was exported to italy, Spain and Japan. 
Today there are 32 commercial Magnox reactors in operation in Western 
European with a total installed power of 9 GWe. The oldest have operated 
satisfactorily for 25 years. 
The more recent Magnox reactors, constructed at the end of the 50s and 
beginning of the 60s, incorporated a primary containment of pre-stressed 
concrete which was subsequently adopted for both the AGR (advanced gas-cooled reactor) 
and the HTGR. 
The AGR, also derived from the Magnox, was developed and marketed in the 
United Kingdom and operates at sufficiently high temperatures (600° C) for a 
conventional and thus high efficiency <38 to 40%) steam cycle to be used. There 
are 10 of these reactors in operation or under construction in the United Kingdo• 
with a total power of 6 GW. 
The technologies developed for the Magnox and AGR as well as the long experience 
gained in operating them formed the basis for the development of the HTGR which, 
in other words, is not an entirely new reactor. 
It is not surprising that Western Europe first successful~y developed the 
HTGR with the DRAGON project (the Dragon reactor constructed in the United Kingdom 
came into operation in 1964) and the AVR <constructed in Germany and went critical 
in 1967). A parallel project in the United States led to the construction of the 
Peach Bottom reactor which came into operation in 1967. 
The high-temperature reactor differs from the Magnox/AGR by virtue of two 
major innovations, i.e. it uses ceramic fuel dispersed in a graphite matrix and 
a chemically inert coolant <helium). The research and development programmes 
carried out in the 60s confirmed the validity of the HTGR concept and allowed 
a system to be devised that, apart from being promising from the economic point 
of view, had and still has intrinsic safety features that are unrivalled. 
Its key feature is the fuel particle with a diameter of from 0.4 to 0.6 mm. 
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The particle may be uranium, thorium or plutonium carbide or, preferably, their 
oxides and is coated with carbon and silicon carbide deposited pyrolitically 
which make it particularly robust and impermeable to the fission products generated 
inside. 
An HTGR reactor contains thousands of millions of these particles linked 
together in graphitized compacts and in graphite fuel elements which are by nature 
good heat conductors and of a considerable strength which, incidentally, increases 
with higher temperatures. The helium coolant which is chemically inert and has 
excellent properties from the point of view of heat exchange, can be raised to very 
high temperatures <7S0°C and even 1,000°C) without the maximum temperature at the 
centre of the fuel particle exceeding 1,300 to 1,500°C, whilst the graphite structures 
remain at intermediate temperatures of between 800 and 1,200°C. 
By comparison, the temperature of the coolant in a light water reactor (about 
350°0 is far below the maximum temperature at the centre of the fuel element (up to 2,CJ:rPc> 
and the maxinun te~Jl>erature at the hottest points of an HTGR is in effect much lower than in a light 
water reactor. 
In conclusion, the operating temperature of an HTGR, although high, is far 
below the limits at which the completely ceramic core could begin to lose its 
geometric and structural properties, and a disaster involving an HTGR core is 
practically inconceivable. 
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The essential design and safety features of an HTGR can be summarized as 
follows: 
- use of a pre-stressed concrete containment with possible redundancy of the 
Load-bearing elements. This essential component is thus very safe; 
- the coolant undergoes no phase change in either normal conditions or in the 
event of an accident; 
Low exposure of the workers to radiation. Helium is inert and does not react 
with the materials in the primary circuit; 
- transparency of the coolant so that the primary circuit can be inspected 
visually during maintenance operations; 
-the core can be designed and optimized in the Light of economic conditions and 
the availability of fissile and fertile material. The conversion factor and 
the burn-up can be varied within wide Limits. The burn-up may exceed 100,000MWd 
per tonne. The reactor can function on an open uranium/plutonium cycle using 
slightly enriched uranium (e.g. 6%), or on a closed uranium/thorium/uranium 
233 cycle (however, techniques have to be developed for reprocessing the 
thorium fuel), or on an open plutonium/uranium cycle <in this case the reactor 
behaves as an optimum plutonium burner). This underlines the potential of 
the HTGR for using natural uranium resources rationally. 
From the point of view of core geometry, reactors with both conventional 
prismatic fuel and spherical fuel elements have been constructed and 
successfully operated. 
- the behaviour of the fuel and of the primary containment in the event of an 
accident is characterized by very slow and in principle predictable transients. 
The quantity of fuel exposed following rupture of a coated particle is 
trivial, and millions of elementary particles have to rupture before 
appreciable quantities of fission products are released into the primary 
circuit. 
- accidental malfunctioning gives rise to slow and limited transients because 
of a highly negative reactivity coefficient, the lack of neutron absorption 
or moderating effect by the coolant, and the great mass and thermal capacity 
of the moderator. 
All these characteristics make the HTGR an ideal candidate to occupy 
sites near densely populated and highly industrialized areas. 
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The Dragon project. The first experimental HTGR was constructed in the 
United Kingdom under the auspices of OECD/NEA. The European Community 
contributed about 48% of the project's funds throughout the 17 years of its 
operation <1959-1976). The Member States and the Community itself also helped 
by providing numerous scientists and engineers. The reactor (20 MWth) was 
constructed in the record time of 4 years and operated practically without 
interruption from 1965 to 1975 (coolant exit temperature 750°C). 
The project developed and very successfully tested coated particle fuel 
elements for both thorium and slightly enriched uranium cycles and found 
engineering solutions to the problem of containing, purifying and handling the 
coolant (helium). 
The AVR. Built at Julich <Federal Republic of Germany), this 15 MWe (about 
45 MWth) reactor had a core composed of fuel particles about 6 cm in diameter 
<the so-called pebble bed). 
It was initially designed for a temperature of 750°C and operated without 
any major interruption until 1967. Since 1974 it has been functioning at an 
exit temperature of 950°C showing that there are no major problems in increasing 
the temperature to about 1,000°C as far as the core is concerned. 
The THTR 300. Construction of this 300 MWe prototype began in Schmehausen 
(Federal Republic of Germany) in 1973 for the HKG consortium. Construction of 
this reactor, designed <like the AVR) round a pebble-bed core, has been 
considerably protracted and it is still not complete. 
Part of the reason for this delay was the long and complex licensing 
procedure which called for changes in the components and systems design from 
time to time. However, the project is now nearing a rapid conclusion. In 
September 1983 the reactor was loaded with fuel and has now reached the first 
criticality stage. 
A zero power experimental programme is now under way and a gradual increase 
in power is planned for the second half of 1984. 
The project was initiated in 1973 as a joint action within the meaning of 
Chapter V of the EURATOM Treaty. 
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Peach Bottom. This reactor was constructed by General Atomic in the United 
States and was managed by Philadelphia Electric from 1967 to 1974. With a power 
of 40 MWe and designed around a conventional prismatic fuel core, it proved so 
reliable that American electricity producers became seriously interested in the 
HTGR as a rival to the light water reactor. 
Fort St Vrain. In 1968 the Public Service Company of Colorado ordered a 
330 MWe reactor constructed by General Atomic using the experience gained at 
Peach Bottom. The reactor went critical in 1974. 
Unforeseen difficulties unconnected with the basic construction principles 
considerably delayed its entry into service. The plant is functioning at 70% of its 
1976 nominal power and the authorizations needed for it to function at 100% have 
already been obtained. 
III. fQ~£b~~!Q~~ 
To cope with the persistent and increasingly rapid deterioration in the 
Community's hydrocarbon supply situation after the year 2000, the contribution 
made by nuclear fission to the Community's energy balance must be maintained and 
if possible improved in the first half of the next century. 
The Community and the Member States must therefore retain the option of 
making fast breeders available as soon as possible to electricity producers on 
a commercial basis. 
It will thus be possible to gain experience and form an opinion of the fast 
superconverter reactors to be used in comparison with alternative strategies. 
This will entail successful continuation of the demonstration programmes 
now under way, consolidation of the industrial infrastructures needed both for 
the reactors and for the fuel cycle and, most importantly, public acceptance 
of the technologies involved, which means that adequate solutions must be found 
to the problems of safety, radiological protection and the ecological effects. 
Since the development of fast reactors in the Community has now reached 
the industrial phase, the Community must play a support role based on its 
current activities in the nuclear sector and consisting mainly of facilitating 
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and speeding up acceptance of the technologies involved by reinforcing its 
efforts to protect the public and the environment, ensure that nuclear energy 
is used for purely peaceful purposes and eliminate technical obstacles. 
The above shows how important it is to develop and commission fast breeders 
at the right time. 
It would be wrong to underestimate the number and difficulty ot the 
problems still to be resolved. 
In many ways these problems are more complex than those encountered when 
introducing the existing thermal reactors. In particular the need to coordinate 
the reactors with the corresponding fuel recycling stages right from the beginning 
puts the political, economic, industrial, technical and ecological problems in 
a new light. 
The main problems so far identified can be summarized as follows: 
(i) the compatibility of fast reactors with the use of nuclear energy for 
purely peaceful purposes; 
(ii) the acceptability of the technology from a safety and environmental point 
of view; 
(iii) the recycling of fuels in fast reactors; 
Civ) the technical obstacles arising from differences in norms and codes 
governing design, manufacture and inspection. 
The present Community strategy for developing fast reactors centres round 
the following two activities: 
(a) action to increase coordination and collaboration between national programmes, 
taken by the Fast Reactor Coordinating Committee1 and its working party on 
safety and construction codes and norms; 
(b) implementation of the Joint Research Centre's research programme (direct 
action programme) on the safety of fast reactors and plutonium fuel. 
1The committee was set up by the Council in April 1970 with the task of drawing 
up and implementing programmes for the broadest possible coordination and 
collaboration between the various programmes using the most suitable procedures 
and formulating any appropriate suggestion to that end. 
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III.2. Ib~_tliB 
Prospects for marketing the HTGR to produce electricity suffered a severe 
blow between 1974 and 1976 when the 8 GWe of reactors ordered from General Atomic 
between 1971 and 1973 by American electricity producing companies were cancelled. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the nuclear energy crisis that followed 
the 1973 oil embargo undeniably did not facilitate the introduction on to the 
market of a new generation of reactors. 
Research and development of the HTGR continued however both in Europe 
<mainly in the Federal Republic of Germany) and in the United States and Japan. 
Interest in the HTGR is currently sustained by the potential it has tor 
energy applications other than electricity, deriving entirely from the 
possibility of producing thermal energy safely and economically at high 
0 temperatures (1000 C and above). 
As we have seen, the reactor itself does not need any further major 
development since the ceramic core already offers an adequate performance. 
On the other hand, the downstream user processes still have to undergo 
a long period of development, especially as regards materials, in the light of 
the market possibilities already identified. 
These possibilities are mainly as follows: 
- process heat for chemical and metallurgical applications, 
- the production of synthetic gas <e.g. synthetic methane) and synthetic liquid 
fuels <e.g. methanol> using solid fuels as the source material. 
This latter application is of particular interest to the Community which 
not only im~Qr!§ solid and gaseous fuels but also ~Q§§~§§~§ large deposits of 
§Q!ig_f~~!§ <e.g. Belgium, FRG, France, United Kingdom>. 
These solid fuels can be used for two purposes: 
- to produce liquid or gaseous fuels that can be transported and used with 
existing infrastructures; 
-to eliminate, through thermochemical processes, impurities such as sulphur 
and harmful products such as nitrogen oxides that would be produced if the solid 
fuels themselves were used for combustion. 
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The HTGR could thus b~1~ gradually to improve the Community's energy 
balance and reduce the harm caused to the environment by the combustion of solid 
fuels. 
Between 1959 and 1976 the European Community gave financial aid for HTGR 
research and development in Europe and promoted coordination of activities in the 
various Member States. When the Dragon project was completed <1976) the role of 
the Community in research and development ceased completely. Today the Community 
plays only a minor management role in the HKG joint action (THTR 300). 
Given the potential importance of the HTGR in the Community's long-term 
energy strategy (in particular reducing energy dependence, exploiting indigenous 
solid fuel resources, reducing environmental pollution) it is to be hoped that the 
Community will promote it more vigorously. 
The Community should gradually take action by: 
- organizing meetings and perhaps financing studies to determine the possible 
future role of the HTGR in the Member States; 
devising R & D programmes and if possible including them in the Community's 
framework programme for science and technology; 
- encouraging (politically and subsequently financially> undertakings and bodies 
that are continuing the work on the HTGR and its applications. 
- 24 - PE 89.172/fin. 
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Annex 4 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION <Doe. 1-691/82> 
tabled by Mr VAN AERSSEN, Mr MOLLER HERMANN, Mr MERTENS, 
Mr MALANGRE, Mr BROK, Mr Karl FUCHS, Mr RINSCHE, Mr SCHNITKER, 
Mr MAJONICA, Mr SAYN-WITTGENST~IN, Mrs RABBETHGE, Mr LEMMER, 
Mrs LENZ, Mr AIGNER, Mr HELMS, Mr VON HASSEL, Mr LUSTER, 
Mrs WALZ, Mr WEDEKIND, Mr Ingo FRIEDRICH and Mr JANSSEN VAN RAAY 
on behalf of the Group of the European People's Party 
(CD-Group) 
and by Mr SELIGMAN and Mr BATTERSBY 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on further construction of high temperature nuclear reactors 
A. Having regard to the common energy poltcy objectives for the period up to 
1990 or 2000, 
e. Having regard to the resolutions adopted by the European Parliament on the 
need to develop further generations of nuclear reactors such as high tem-
perature reactors and fast breeders, 
1. Supports, in the intere~~s of a common EEC energy policy, further construc-
tion of the high temperature reactor at Hammschmehausen and of the fast 
breeder at Kalkar; 
2. Calls on the Commission to examine to what extent bridging loans can be 
made available by the EEC to the builders of these installations; 
3. Instructs its President to forward thi1 resolution to the Co••istion and 
the Council. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doe. 1-839/82> 
tabled by Mr VANDEMEULEBROUCKE 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on further construction of fast breeder reactors 
Ibt.iwt2Qtto_e!t1itmto~ 
A Having regard to the continually rising cost of 
experimental and prototype fast breeder nuclear 
reactors, and the decision of the Federal German 
I 
government not to contribute further public funds 
to the Kalkar reactor, 
8 Having regard to the resolutions of the European 
Parliament emphasizing the potential of alternative 
energy sources <solar, bio-mass> for meeting energy 
needs within a far shorter time-scale.than 11 
forecast for the fast breeder, 
1. calls on the commission and the Council to 
revise their energy policy stance, and in 
particular to abandon any commitment to the 
fast breeder or other high-cost nuclear 
technology with uncertain prospects Chigh 
temperature reactors, nuclear fusion>; 
z. considers that for EEC financing and loans of 
all kinds priority should go to alternative 
energy development, and energy conservation, 
over such nuclear technology; 
3. instructs its President to forward this 
resolution to the Commission, the CounciL and 
the governments of Me•ber States. 
- 29 -
Annex 5 
PE 89.172/fin./A~S 

